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1 Introduction
The design of the London Underground Diagram (LUD) is a well-known example
of representational efficiency, facilitating urban transportation for thousands of
everyday users, copied by urban transportation systems worldwide. Present in
virtually every major city in the world, it has established an international
paradigm on how to perform simple decision-making tasks regarding networks
of stations and lines. Its origins date back to 1933, when the engineer draughts-
man Henry C. (Harry) Beck proposed several innovative features to the old
Underground Map, sacrificing geographic accuracy in favor of specialization in
particular tasks (see Walker 1979).
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This paper explores the design of the London Underground Diagram identi-
fying the semiotic basis of its representational efficiency. Efficiency in a repre-
sentation is a matter of iconic semiosis.1 Several conceptions of iconicity have
been acknowledged: the icon is operationally defined as a sign whose manip-
ulation reveals, by direct observation of its intrinsic property, some information
on its object (operational iconicity) (CP 2.2792; Stjernfelt 2011: 397); but it has
also been connected to representational features involved in the specialization
of signs for certain purposes (optimal iconicity) (Stjernfelt 2011: 415). It is the
type of sign whose signification is S-dependent (that means, dependent on the
sign itself) and, more traditionally, it has been defined as similarity between the
sign and its object. These different conceptions of iconicity sometimes appear to
generate contradictory claims regarding representational efficiency. To solve
such contradictions, we stress that a specialized representation is an icon of
the formal structure of the problem for which it has been specialized.
Icons are cognitive artifacts, material tools that embed cognition and shape
our minds. The London Underground Map is a remarkable example of a cogni-
tive artifact, providing a niche3 built for extraction and manipulation of rela-
tions, capable of generating overall changes in the behavior of the users and
influencing in the understanding of the city itself.
In the following sections, we (i) introduce Peirce’s concept of iconic sign, (ii)
describe the London Underground Diagram and its representational features,
(iii) investigate the LUD’s efficiency by examining its relevant innovations in the
light of different conceptions of iconicity, (iv) describe its role in cognitive niche
construction. Our conclusions relate cognitive distribution and niche construc-
tion with representational efficiency as a matter of iconicity.
1 We employ the term “representational efficiency” in the sense used by Zhang (1997), meaning
the easiness of use of representations in problem-solving tasks, which can be empirically
measured through the comparison of cognitive performances on isomorphic representations
(see Zhang and Norman 1994; Zhang 1997; Chuah et al. 2000). In this sense, representational
efficiency is an influence that is directed from the material features of the representation to the
cognitive performance. This process is identified as iconic: signification is determined by the
sign materiality (criterion of relative dependence of the sign process) and problem-solving
involves the discovery of information about an object (operational definition of the sign) (see
Atã and Queiroz 2014). This is not to say that indexical and symbolic signification is absent, but
rather that the decisive element for efficiency is iconicity.
2 Following a scholarship tradition, Peirce’s work will be referred to as CP (followed by volume
and paragraph number for quotes from The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce).
3 In Ecology, the concept of niche means the environmental conditions required for a certain
species to live. Cognitive niche construction is related to the transformation of problem spaces
in order to aid thinking (see Clark 2006a).
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2 Peirce’s iconic semiosis
Peirce defined semiosis (sign-mediated processes) as an irreducible triadic relation
between a sign (S), its object (O) and its interpretant (I). We will hereafter refer to
this triad as S-O-I. That is, according to Peirce, any description of semiosis involves
a relation constituted by three irreducibly connected terms (CP 2.242), S-O-I.
As it is well known, sign-mediated processes show a notable variety. There are
three fundamental kinds of signs underlying meaning processes – icons, indexes,
and symbols. Respectively, a sign may be analogous to its object, spatio-tempo-
rally connected to it, or might represent it by means of a law, rule, or norm. These
classes correspond to relations of similarity, contiguity, and law between sign and
object (see Table 1). Icons are signs that stand for their objects through similarity or
resemblance, irrespective of any spatio-temporal physical correlation that sign S
may have with an existent O. If a determinative relation of the S by the O is a
relation of analogy, that is, if S is a sign of O in virtue of a certain quality that S
and O share, then S is an icon of O. S and O are related due to the identity of some
aspect they share. Icons are very dependent on the material, form, and structure of
which they are made – “An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes
merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same,
whether any such Object actually exists or not” (CP 2.247). In contrast, if S is a sign
of O by reason of “a direct physical connection” (CP 1.372) between them, S is said
to be an index of O. In that case, S is really determined by O, in such a way that
both must exist as events – “An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it
denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object” (CP 2.248). The notion of
spatio-temporal co-variation is the most characteristic property of indexical pro-
cesses. The examples range from a pronoun demonstrative or relative, which
“forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it” (CP
1.369), to physical symptoms of diseases, photographs, weathercocks, thermo-
meters. Finally, in a symbol, the relation between S and O is logically dependent
on the third term, I. In a symbolic relation, the interpretant stands for “the object
through the sign” by a determinative relation of law, rule or convention (CP 2.276).
Table 1: The fundamental types of signs underlying meaning processes – icons, indexes, and
symbols. They are characterized in terms of relative dependence of sign-object-interpretant
(S-O-I) components in triadic relation.
Sign S-O relation S-O-I dependence
Icon Similarity Monadic (S) Dependent of intrinsic properties of S
Index Contiguity Dyadic (S-O) Dependent of S-O spatio-temporal correlation
Symbol Law Triadic (S-O-I) S-O dependent of I mediation
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The icon is the only type of sign that involves a direct presentation of
qualities that pertain to its object. Analogies depend on icons. When manipu-
lated, the icon “reveals” aspects or qualities of its object.
The key of iconicity is not perceived resemblance between the sign and what
it signifies but rather the possibility of making new discoveries about the object
of a sign through observing features of the sign itself. Thus a mathematical
model of a physical system is an iconic representation because its use provides
new information about the physical system. This is the distinctive feature and
value of iconic representation: a sign resembles its object if, and only if, study of
the sign can yield new information about the object (Hookway 2002: 102).
The icon is not just the only type of sign involving a direct presentation of
qualities that pertain to its object; it is also the only sign through which, by its
direct observation, it is possible to discover something about its object.
Maps, graphs and diagrams are special types of icons. As soon as an icon can
be considered as consisting of interrelated parts, and since these relations are
subject to experimental manipulation governed by laws, we are working with
diagrams (see Stjernfelt 2007: 92). Diagrams are the principal way of acquiring
new knowledge about relations. They represent, through the relations between its
parts, the relations that constitute the related parts of the object it represents. The
object of the diagram is always a relationship, and the related parts of the diagram
represent the relationships that constitute the object represented. The prototypical
diagram is described as the manipulation of a geometric figure for the observation
of a theorem. But the idea is quite general. An example taken from algebra is
enlightening: “In fact, every algebraic equation is an icon, since that shows,
through their algebraic signs (which are not themselves icons) relations of the
quantities involved” (CP 2.282, emphasis added). Indeed, if a sign is observed as a
whole consisting of interrelated parts, and these related parts are subject to
experimental modification governed by rules, we are operating with a diagram.
The London Underground Diagram is an example of a diagrammatic cogni-
tive artifact, providing a niche built for extraction of relational properties.
3 London Underground Diagram (LUD):
A cognitive tool for its users
The London Underground Diagram (LUD) is a hallmark of information design
that influenced many other public transportation diagrams, a “form of repre-
sentation judged to be so effective that it is now employed by virtually every
transportation authority in the world” (Spence 2007: 77).
4 Pedro Atã et al.
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The original version of the LUD was created by the Henry C. (Harry) Beck in
1933. Previously to the LUD, maps of the London Underground System adhered
to geographically more accurate representations of the lines and station loca-
tions (see Figure 1).
Beck produced his first sketch for the London UndergroundMap in 1931. The design
was based upon and adapted from an electrical circuit diagram (with which Beck
was familiar as he was an engineer draughtsman). Such diagrams omit or falsify the
relative physical position of wires in order to convey the information about con-
nectivity. Beck saw a similarity with the underground railway network in that it was
possible to ignore the geographical information altogether and remove some of the
sources of confusion in the previous, more literal maps (Whitby 1996: 70).
Figure 1:Q4 A route guide of the Underground System made by F.H. Stingmore, published circa
1932 (this is an overall equivalent version of Stingmore’s 1919 guide shown in Garland [1994],
the only difference being the addition of a few stations and lines). The background is blank and
the different lines are color-coded. Although the concern for geographic accuracy diminished in
comparison with the previous maps, it is a central component of the design. © TfL from the
London Transport Museum collection.
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Beck’s initial sketch was transformed into a properly labeled and color-
coded diagram (Figure 2) where he compressed the outlying portions of lines.
The central area of the network appears to be viewed through a convex lens so
as to enlarge its scale, and route lines are simplified in verticals, horizontals and
diagonals (45°) (Garland 1994: 16).
In later versions of the London Underground Diagram based on the last of Beck’s
diagrams (published in 1959), his successors retained the essential structure from
the original: octagonal grid and colored lines meeting at angles of 90° or 45°;
stations arranged to show the position of each one to the next instead of the real
geographic distance between them; the presence of the simplified River Thames
along the bottom of the diagram helping the notion of position and scale; non-
interchange stations represented by ticks and interchange stations represented
sometimes by rings sometimes by diamonds (Garland 1994). Graphical changes
such as changing the color of the lines and the fonts used in the names of the
stations in order to improve the grasping of information by the users and reduce
Figure 2:Q5 Beck’s original Underground Diagram, from 1933. © TfL from the London Transport
Museum collection.
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their possibility of confusion were made, also to accommodate the expansion of
the transport system. As a result of the adaptations and modifications made by
Beck and his successors, we have the diagram as we know it today.
4 Representational efficiency and iconic semiosis
in the London Underground Diagram
The LUD (Figure 2) has been recognized as more efficient than a geographically
more accuratemap (such as Figure 1). We assume that the type of semiosis involved
in the signification of the efficient properties of a representation is the iconic
semiosis (see Atã and Queiroz 2014; Zhang and Norman 1994; Zhang 1997).
Efficiency corresponds to advantage in the material manipulation of the sign for a
certain goal. Iconicity is involved whenever signification is dependent on the
materiality and structure of the sign. However, to say that difference in efficiency
is due to iconicity is not enough to clarify what happened in the transition from the
oldmap to the LUD that has shaped the cognitive niche of the users. In the following
paragraphs, we further analyze the notion of iconicity and the representational
differences between the two representations of London Underground System.
The notion of iconicity can be understood in different ways. Traditionally, it
has been defined as “similarity” between sign and object. It has also been defined
as relative dependence on S in the S-O relation (see Queiroz 2012). Stjernfelt (2011)
identifies two different contrasting conceptions of icon and iconicity in Peirce’s
work: first, the icon can be operationally defined as any sign whose manipulation
is able to reveal more information about its object. This operational definition of
the icon focuses solely on the capability of a sign to enclose information about its
object. Following the author, we use the term “operational iconicity” to refer to the
conception of iconicity arising solely from this operational definition. Operational
iconicity contrasts with a stricter notion that considers factors such as immediacy
of the information presented and economy of elements. We refer to the conception
arising from these stricter criteria as “optimal iconicity” (Stjernfelt 2011: 400).
Stjernfelt (2011: 414) exemplifies the distinction between operational and
optimal iconicity through the example of a digital picture. A picture can be
digitally represented as pixels on a screen or as a linear sequence of digital
information. If we only take into account the operational definition of the icon,
the two representations are equally iconic: they are informationally equivalent
(i.e. enclose the same amount of information), and one can be algorithmically
transformed into the other. However, this operational definition alone ignores
some representational features that are decisive for the S-O relationship in each
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sign: in the pictorial image, for example, object contours are represented as
continuous lines while in the linear digital representation this information is
scattered throughout the code. A single object contour is materially closer to a
single continuous line than several scattered pieces of information, regardless of
the interpreter (see Stjernfelt 2011: 414). Therefore, it is more iconic. Put in
another words, a one-to-one correspondence holds some kind of logical and
phenomenological intrinsic iconic value that is shattered by a one-to-several
correspondence.4 This is an example of the optimal notion of iconicity.
In the LUD, the operational iconicity criterion is able to unambiguously
identify the diagram as an icon. It must be iconic semiosis, since a user
manipulating the LUD is able to discover implicit information about the
Underground System, e.g. on which line to embark to get to a specific station.
It does not differentiate, however, between the LUD and older maps. On the
other hand, the optimal iconicity criterion is able to stress the LUD’s specializa-
tion as a problem-solving tool, thus differentiating it from other representations
equally capable of revealing information about lines and stations.
The LUD has proved to be more efficient for navigation in the Underground
System than a geographically more accurate map (such as Figure 1), even
though the latter contains more information about the Underground System
than the former (see Table 2).
4 Stjernfelt (2011) has related the development from a more operational to an optimal concep-
tion of iconicity to the transition to a more realist stance in Peirce’s philosophy.
Table 2: A comparison between information of O (the Underground System) contained in S (maps
and diagrams) for the LUD and a geographically accurate map of the Underground System. The LUD
contains less information about the Underground System than the map. Therefore, it is less iconic
for operational iconicity, suggesting it to be less similar to the Object. However, it is more efficient,
therefore more iconic for optimal iconicity, suggesting it to be more similar to the Object.
Information of O accurately contained in S Geographically accurate
Map
London Underground
Diagram
Stations Yes Yes
Connections between stations (tube lines) Yes Yes
Connections between lines (interchange
stations)
Yes Yes
Distance between stations Yes No
Geographic location of stations Yes No
Length of lines Yes No
Specific directions and changes of
directions of lines
Yes No
8 Pedro Atã et al.
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There is more information to be discovered about the Underground System in
a geographically accurate map than in the LUD. In this sense, we should conclude
that the map is more iconic than the LUD with regard to operational iconicity.
Since operational iconicity is a detrivialization of the psychological notion of
similarity (see Stjernfelt 2011: 397), we can also conclude that a geographically
accurate map is more similar to the Underground System than the LUD. The same
conclusion might be reached intuitively: an observer, looking at the map which
shows the real trajectories of the lines through the city might say that “it looks
more like” the real Underground System than a simplified diagram.
The above conclusion appears to inflict a contradiction between similarity
and representational efficiency. A geographically accurate map is more iconic
(operational iconicity) and “looks more like” the Underground System itself, and
yet it is less efficient for navigation in the same Underground System than a
simplified diagram. The contradiction can also be understood in terms of oppos-
ing operational and optimal iconicity. Compared to a geographically accurate
map, the LUD is simultaneously less iconic for operational iconicity, thus, less
similar, and more iconic for optimal iconicity, thus, more similar.
This, we argue, is a false contradiction, that points to what is relevant in the
transition from the old maps to the LUD: while the geographically accurate map
might actually be more similar to the London Underground System understood
as a whole, the LUD, with the rules of manipulation and behavior it entails, is
more similar to the particular experience of the Underground users and the most
relevant variables involved in the choices they need to make. This experience of
orientation and navigation in the Underground System can be modeled as a
game (see Walker 1979) with a formal structure that comprises an initial state
(the user’s current station), a final state (destination), intermediate states and a
set of rules (see Table 3). The LUD is a more efficient representation because it
embeds this formal structure more directly than a geographically accurate map.5
It is easier to locate the user current location (initial state) and destination (final
state). It is also easier to grasp the overall structure of possible lines and
connections among which to choose (intermediate states), with no superfluous
information such as changes of directions or specific distances between stations.
There are others notable factors why the LUD, with regard to its rules of
action and behavior, can be seem as more similar to the experience of a user in
5 A similar argument is presented by Zhang and Norman (1994): in one of their experiments,
the authors argue that the more efficient isomorph of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle game is the one
that externalizes most rules of the game, so that the performance of the players is efficiently
constrained. This process of externalization of constraints has been characterized as iconic (Atã
and Queiroz 2014).
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the Underground System than a geographically accurate map. The concrete
experience a user has on an Underground trip is one of no visible landscape
or landmarks with which to mark and be conscious of the specific changes of
direction of the lines or the specific distances traveled. Since there is also no
traffic and the trains move in high speed, the differences in distance can be less
significant for the amount of time a train will spend to get to the destination
than the number of stops it will need to make. The experience the user has is,
arguably, of a continuous homogeneous movement interrupted only by the
stops in the stations, just like a straight line undisturbed by topographic issues
and interrupted only by the chain of blobs or ticks that represent the stations. In
this sense, a hypothetical user that is completely unaware of the geography of
the city of London above the ground and is familiar only with the experience of
the Underground might agree that, even intuitively, the LUD looks more like the
Underground System than a geographically accurate map.
In comparison to its predecessor, Beck’s diagram has diminished the amount
of implicit reachable information in the map, reducing the number of possible
operations to be performed (to know about real distances, for example). Beck has
added features that do not increase the amount of information, but rather
decrease the difficulty of the search for the proper information, which influences
in the whole process of problem-solving. That means to say that the behavior of
the user as well as the task itself are constrained and, to a certain extent, defined
by the material iconic features of the representation. A problem solver behaves
Table 3: The formal structure of the game-like experience a user has when trying to solve
problems related to navigation in the Underground System.
The Underground User Game: Formal Structure
Initial State the user’s current station
Final state the user’s goal station
Intermediate states every the stations the user is going to access in order to go from the
initial to the final state.
Rules for moving
between states
In order to move the user embarks on a train, following its path on the
line until the station (final or intermediate) she wants to disembark.
The train will follow its path on one particular orientation until the
end of the line. It will not change its trajectory, orientation or line
while traveling.
There are two types of stations: normal stations only allow for
embarking or disembarking on one line. Interchange stations allow
for changing lines.
10 Pedro Atã et al.
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according to a problem space that corresponds to a formal structure of states and
rules; this problem space is made available through iconic features of the repre-
sentations involved in the cognitive process of solving the problem, so that this
material representational features shape the behavior of the solvers. Change in
efficiency in the transition from the geographically more accurate maps to the
LUD corresponds to iconicity in the LUD putting the users in direct touch with
rules that are really part of the experience of using the Underground System.
5 The London Underground Diagram as a
cognitive artifact
Peirce can be considered an important precursor of the situated mind and
distributed cognition thesis (Atã and Queiroz 2014). Recently, the distributed
cognition and extended mind approach have questioned the legitimacy of skin
and skull to serve as criteria for the demarcation of the boundaries between
mind and the outside world (see Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 1998, Clark
2006b). For Peirce, mind is semiosis (i.e., sign action) in a materially embedded
form and cognition is the development of available semiotic artifacts, in which is
embodied a power to produce interpretants (see Skagestad 2004). From this
perspective, the fundamental unit of cognitive interest is reconceived and
replaced by an environmentally embedded space of semiotic skills and artifacts.
As we adapt the environment to facilitate our purposes, deploying our mind in
external representations, we participate in the construction of cognitive (or
semiotic) niches, which fundamentally alter our cognitive capabilities (see
Clark 2006a).
Cognitive niche construction transforms the environment in which cognition
takes place, through the selection of environmental features capable of mediat-
ing and controlling behavior (see Magnani 2009; Clark 2008: 61–63).
Beck’s design has reduced the similarity of the LUD to the geographical
identity of the Underground System and instead increased its similarity to a
specific structure of rules and goals that characterizes a particular experience of
urban transportation and urban space. It has selected a habit – a set of relations
and rules of action – and materialized it through iconicity so that it manifests
itself again as iconic semiosis in the behavior of the users. This formal structure
thus becomes a coupled part of the mind of Londoners, now hybrid beings
embedded with a particular set of rules of action. For them, the LUD stands as a
common familiar model, a specialized environment built for extraction and
manipulation of relations. In this sense, the impact of the efficiency of the
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LUD goes beyond the scope of discrete particular problem-solving tasks. It
becomes part of the semiotic niche of urban dwellers, making them more suited
to the urban environment and influencing in their overall behavior and percep-
tion towards the city. It is “more than a simplification of Underground railway
routes […] it is an essential simplification of the city itself” (Garland 1994: 5).
6 Some conclusions
In our approach, while it may be of little relevance whether cognition is hap-
pening inside or outside the head, it is decisive that it must happen in repre-
sentations: writing tools, modeling artifacts, notational systems, languages, and
so forth. This conception neither restricts representations to symbolic semiosis
as would orthodox representationalism nor rejects representations as would
anti-representationalism. The study of distributed cognition benefits from the
system proposed by Peirce in the sense that it offers a model of how and by
virtue of what the mind semiotically unfolds itself. As the study of the repre-
sentations and its functioning becomes a necessary part of the study of cogni-
tion, Peirce’s conception of icon arises as an important tool for the investigation
of thought processes.
Iconicity is a central idea that connects cognitive distribution, niche con-
struction and representational efficiency. An efficient representation is an icon
of a structure of habits (rules of action) that foster certain kinds of cognitive
behavior that are appropriate for an objective (here conceived as a game-like
activity with an initial state and a goal state). Iconicity helps to clarify how it is
possible for a habit to be embedded on a representation and be forced upon the
user. Representational features act themselves as rules of action because of the
interrelatedness of its parts being analogous to certain effects of the environ-
ment that allow: (i) the embedding of extractable information in the sign about
the object (related to operational iconicity) and (ii) the direct manipulation of
this information (related to optimal iconicity). Through iconicity, cognition is
distributed. As representations mold cognitive behavior, they become part of an
ongoing process of niche construction, where the cognitive potentialities of
groups of individuals are expanded or directed towards certain purposes. In
our example, a particular experience of urban transportation, partly determined
by the technology itself of Underground transportation, materializes itself on a
sign that causes urban dwellers to adapt to it, thus participating in niche
construction. The most decisive step of the process happens through iconic
semiosis. The reduction of the amount of information in a representation by
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virtue of its specialization for specific tasks does not oppose different concep-
tions about iconicity, but rather redefines the object of the sign, clarifying its
role as the materialization of a problem space optimized to function as an
environment where cognition develops through manipulation of diagrams.
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